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ALEX ELSON and LEONARD SCHANFIELD*
THE social and economic stresses of war and reconversion have pro-
duced an upsurge of activity to make more effective use of the processes
of law to reduce discrimination in employment. The federal Fair Em-
ployment Practices Committee carried on intense efforts in this direc-
tion during the war; several states have enacted anti-discrimination
statutes; and more recently a substantial number of municipal ordi-
nances, looking to local authority as an additional weapon with which
to attack discrimination, have been introduced.
Most Americans will agree that there are sound moral, economic,
social and legal reasons against discrimination because of race, color or
religion. Morally, discrimination is but one way by which the majority
bullies minorities. Whether all members of the majority group join in
the discriminatory practice is immaterial. The fact is that discrimina-
tion lessens the dignity and stature of the entire community and runs
counter to the moral principles of this nation.' Our historic and uni-
versal acceptance of equality of opportunity, justice and liberty as the
standards of the American way of life has bred a struggle to square the
national conscience with the fact that minority racial and religious
groups, so prevalent in our nation,2 do not find this "a land of equal
opportunity for all." a The recent war, with its emphasis upon ideolo-
gies, intensified the struggle, for it was difficult-and embarrassing-
to denounce the Nazis' racial and religious theories when only the self-
*MIembers of the Illinois Bar.
The authors acknowledge their indebtedness to the American Council on Race Relations
for maklng available copies of the proposed Municipal Ordinances, correspondence relating
thereto, and for other assistance.
1. MYRDAL, AN AImERicAN DiLEmnA (1944) c. I, passim.
2. H. R. REP. No. 2016, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) 2, and SEN. REP. No. 1109,
78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) disclose the following figures:
13,000,000 Negroes; 3,000,000 Americans of Melcan or Spanish origin; 5,000,00D
Jews; 22,000,000 Catholics; 6,000,000 aliens.
- 3. Evidence of the extent of discrimination may be found in Fns, REORT O F.E.P.C.
(Gov't Printing Office 1945) 29, 250; and REPORT oF THE NEw YoRX Srr T1FoRlARY
Co sssioN AGAINST DiscauUNATIoN, Legislative Document (1945) No. 6.
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deceived could deny the existence of similar theories in America. 4 Eco-
nomically, denial of employment is a denial of independence. More-
over, it deprives a community of productive labor when it is needed,
and in periods of economic stress dooms individuals discriminated
against to dependence upon charity or public subsidy. Socially, the
by-products of discrimination are slum areas, race riots, juvenile delin-
quency and crime. Legally, discrimination in employment violates the
concepts of justice expressed in the Declaration of Iridependence, the
Bill of Rights and the Federal and State Constitutions.
Despite general agreement on the desirability of eliminating dis-
crimination in employment, there is sharp disagreement as to the most
effective means for achieving this objective., Many persons sympa-
thetic with the objective oppose the use of law as being an ineffective,
perhaps harmful approach. Reduced to its simplest terms, the argu-
ment is that discrimination is a personal matter which can be solved
only by education-not by legislation. This approach to law is basi-
cally most conservative. In essence it is the belief that law gives form
to what the community has already accepted and practiced as a cus-
tom, that the legislative process simply mirrors community behavior
patterns.
If this concept of law is correct, the law instead of being a vital dy-
namic force is static. Myrdal suggests that acceptance of the theory
that "stateways cannot change follcvays" must be explained, in the
light of specific American conditions, as the translation of a defeatist
attitude int6 a general theory.' The emergence of the modern service
state, with its primary goal the promotion of the general welfare, how-
ever, has swept away these obsolete notions of the function of law. If
we were to wait for the mores of the entire group to catch up with the
abuses of industrial society, we would still have extensive child labor,
long and arduous hours of work, uncompensated industrial accidents,
old age without security, grossly underpaid workers and unilateral
dictation of employment contracts. As stated by an eminent student
of sociological jurisprudence:
"Legislation, in its creative branch, is one of the most marvelous
of human inventions' It would be unwise to leave the course of
4. "In a recent letter to FEPC, then Acting Secretary of State Acheson stated that
in his opinion 'the existence of discrimination against minority groups in the United States
is a handicap in our relations with other countries. The Department of State, therefore, has
good reason to hope for the continued and increased effectiveness of public and private
effort to do away these discriminations.' " CLEARING HousE RELEASE No. 24, AM.RICAN
CouNcIL ON RACE RELATIONS. FEPC (June 26, 1946) Summary and Conclusion.
5. See Hunt, The Proposed Fair Employment Practice Act; Fact & Fallacies (1945)
32 VA. L. REv. 1, 22.
6. MYRDAL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 19, 20, 1031. See also McWilliams, Race Discritni.
nation and the Law (1945) 9 ScI. AND Soc. 1.
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social life to the irrational vagaries of custom when the possibilty
of influencing it in a conscious and enlightened manner is given." 
7
It is true, as our experience with the Prohibition Amendment testi-
fies, that legislation cannot race too far ahead of what the community
is ready to accept. But in dealing with legislation aimed against dis-
criminatory employment practices, we have a completely different situ-
ation than that involving intoxicating beverages. Equality of eco-
nomic opportunity is a basic part of the articulated American philoso-
phy of government. Legislation merely attempts to close the gap be-
tween preachment and practice and to translate into reality a long-
established and frequently stated belief. Nor is such legislation an at-
tempt to legislate the Golden Rule. There is no question but that a
law directed at controlling an individual's thoughts would have little
likelihood of success, if for no other reason than inability to determine
when it is being violated. But a law regulating employment practices
regulates behavior, not thoughts; it prohibits the act of refusing em-
ployment because of an applicant's color or religion-not subjective
concepts on the matter.
It has been said that "where the value of an act depends mainly on
the spirit in which it is performed, it is not a proper subject for legal
control." 8 The point is not applicable to FEP legislation, for the value
of the act of abstaining from discrimination does not depend on the
spirit in which it is done. It may be done grudgingly, but if its result is
to give employment to an individual who previously would have been
discriminated against, it will have served its immediate purpose. Thus,
for example, the old and well established "custom" of black-listing-
discrimination because of union affiliation-has been effectively
checked, and employment contracts affecting millions of workers have
been negotiated through processes of collective bargaining imposed by
law.9 The remarkable success of the FEPC during its short life and the
progress being made under comparable state legislation should dispel
any doubts as to the effectiveness of law as a means of eliminating dis-
criminatory employment practices.
EXISTING FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION
Various federal statutes enacted in the last decade have forbidden
racial and religious discrimination, 10 but none has to any extent covered
7. Timasheff, The Sociology of Law in HARVAIRD SOCIOLOGIc.C STUDIES (1939) 311.
See also FRmDmA.xN, LEG.AL THEORY (1944) 182-3: "As modern social conditions demand
more and more active control, the state extends its purposes. Consequently custom recedes
before deliberately made law, mainly statute and decree. At the same time, law emanating
from central authority as often moulds social habits as it is moulded itself."
8. MACIVER, SocImT-ITs STRUCTURE & CIANGEs (1933) 274-5.
9. See Bernhardt, The Right to a Job (1945) 30 CoRN. L. Q. 292, 304-5.
10. See Dublirer, Legislation Oitlawing Racial Discriminalion in Employment (1945)
s LA YERs GULD R.EV. 101, 104 n:35.
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discrimination in employment. The first major attack on the national
problem was made in 1941 by an Executive Order creating the wartime
Fair Employment Practices Committee."' The life of this agency,
however, was brought to a premature end, and Congress has not yet
seen fit to re-establish it on a permanent basis.
12
Prior to 1945 some states had passed laws banning discrimination in
very limited fields of employment." Since then comprehensive bills
have been introduced in more than twenty states 14 and have been
passed in New York,16 New Jersey,"5 Indiana,"7 Wisconsin,"8 and
Massachusetts. 9 In general these bills are similar in pattern. After
setting forth legislative findings, they prohibit discrimination in em-
ployment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. Next, those
"unfair labor practices" which constitute discrimination are defined.
The persons and fields of employment covered and exempted are then
specified, and an administrative agency or officer is given the power of
investigation, hearing and enforcement.
At least until all states take action, there will of course remain a need
for federal legislation if effective, nation-wide progress against discrimi-
nation is to be made. There is also a practical value to federal legisla-
tion in those few states having anti-discrimination statutes, for it must
be conceded that in general the federal government, perhaps because
of its greater resources, has a better record for effective law enforcement
than state or local governments. Conversely, since a federal law would
be limited to employment practices of the national government and of
11. For history and discussion of the FEPC, see Murray, The Right to Equal Opportu.
nity it; Employment (1945) 33 CALIF. L. REv. 388. The Committee was created June 25,
1941, as a war agency by Executive Order No. 8802. Executive Order No. 9346 further
defined the Committee's powers. The law prohibited discriminatory employment practices
because of race, creed, color, or national origin in government service, in defense industries
and by trade unions. The FEPC was created to administer the law.
12. Being only a war-time agency the FEPC could not last beyond the official end of
the war. Congress, however, brought about its end much sooner by refusing to grant an
appropriation to the Committee. When Congress adjourned a bill was still pending in each
house (S. 101 and H. R. 2232) known by the title "Fair Employment Practice Act." See
Maslow, FEPC-A Case History in Parliamentary Maneuver (1946) 13 U. OF Cu:. L. Rav.
407.
13. See Dublirer, supra note 10, at 104. Such laws, however, have been ineffective,
14. See Dublirer, supra note 10, at 105 n. 46. See also Maslow, The Law and Race
Relations (1946) 244 ANNALs 75, 79.
15. N. Y. Laws 1946, c. 118. Discussed in Note (1945) 19 ST. JoaNi's L. ItEv. 170;
Turner, The New York State Law Against Discrimination (1946) 4 NAT. BAR. J. 3 (a brief
discussion of how the Commission has been functioning to date); 17 N. Y. STA'TE B. A.
BuLL. 76.
16. N.J. Laws 1945, c. 169; 18 N. J. STAT. ANN. (West, Supp. 1946) 25-1, discussed in
68 N.J.L.J. 217, 219, 221, 225, 227.
17. Ind. Laws 1945, c. 325; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, Supp. 1945) 40-2301.
18. Wis. Laws 1945, c. 490.
19. Mass. Laws 1946, c. 368; 1 ANN. LAWS OF MAss. (Michie, Supp. 1946) c. 6, § 56.
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businesses engaged in interstate commerce, complementary state legis-
lation would be needed even if a federal act were passed.
MuxIcrPAL REGULATION
Since it is in urban areas that the problem is most acute, it is not sur-
prising that there has been increasing discussion of the desirability of
city ordinances to prevent discriminatory employment practices. The
need for integration of minority groups into the defense program, the
difficulty of obtaining federal and state legislation, and local agitation
by prominent minority groups for immediate progress have combined
to stimulate municipal action. In August, 1945, Chicago became the
first city to enact an ordinance on the subject; with Milwaukee and
very recently Minneapolis following suit. -'3 Similar ones have now
been proposed or introduced in Buffalo, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Cin-
cinnati, Detroit,21 Cleveland, Seattle, Los Angeles, Toledo, Spokane,
San Diego and Indianapolis.
If local ordinances can be so drafted as to pass the stringent tests of
legality generally applied to all municipal acts, they offer several ad-
vantages not found in state FEP legislation. First, it may be easier to
secure their passage, for discrimination is apt to affect a greater propor-
tion of voters in the cities than on a state-wide basis; and, moreover,
what numerical strength minority groups have in the state is in many
cases diluted in the legislature by districting schemes giving dispropor-
tionately large representation to rural areas. Secondly, local enforce-
ment tends to be more vigorous and efficient, partly because law en-
forcement is usually regarded as a local problem. Thirdly, local FEP
ordinances can be utilized much more effectively as educational devices
than either state or federal statutes; a commission concentrating on the
problem of discrimination within the city can make the community
aware of its own situation and alive to the need of legal sanctions when
other means fail. Education at the local level, if properly carried out,
should yield maximum benefits. These advantages of municipal ordi-
nances would seem to outweigh the ever-present danger that local po-
litical influences and the power and prestige of selfish individuals may
carry greater weight than they would at either the state or the federal
level.
The provisions of most of the municipal ordinances so far proposed
fall into four sections: findings and policy, coverage, unfair employment
practices and enforcement and penalties.
Findings and policy. Chicago and Seattle state the policy of the ordi-
20. The Milwaukee ordinance was passed May 13, 1946. Minneapolis enacted its
ordinance which is similar to that proposed for Detroit on Jan. 31, 1947. The Chicago ordi-
nance is set forth in App. I.
21. See App. II.
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nance to be cooperation with the United States in winning the peace
by securing the aid of all workers regardless of color, creed, etc.
22
Milwaukee relates the ordinance to the state's policy against discrimi-
nation.23 Other cities make findings that discrimination in employment
affects the progress and prosperity of the city;24 impairs the health and
living standards of minority groups; gives rise to economic and social
tensions; and endangers the peace, safety, and general welfare of the
community.25 Nearly all make some statement that discrimination is
contrary to our basic democratic traditions. 2 A few wisely state that
the ordinance is an exercise of the police power of the city to promote
the peace, safety, health and general welfare. 2
Coverage. All of the ordinances cover three groups: the city, includ-
ing all officials and employees thereof; contracting agencies of the city;
and private persons. Contracting agencies are required to include in
all contracts or orders a provision requiring the contractor, his agents
and sub-contractors to observe the provisions of the ordinance. 28 The
provisions covering private persons differ primarily in their degree of
specification. The Chicago ordinance merely states that it shall be
unlawful for "any person to discriminate against any other person." 21
In such a case, it would appear desirable for the sake of clarity to define
"person" to include individuals, partnerships, associations, corpora-
22. See App. I, § 1.
23. "Whereas, the State of Wisconsin, through its duly elected representative, has set
forth a policy against discrimination in public and private employment; and . . ."
24. For example, Toledo and Cleveland: "Whereas, the progress and prosperity of this
City is dependent upon full employment of workers, regardless of race, creed, color or na-
tional origin ... "
25. See Detroit ordinance § 1, App. II. The Minneapolis ordinance states that "Such
job discrimination tends unjustly to condemn large groups of inhabitants of this City to
depressed living conditions, which breed vice, ignorance, disease, degeneration, juvenile
delinquency and crime, thereby causing grave injury to the public safety, general welfare
and good order of this City, and endangering the public health thereof." § 1. (b).
26. Philadelphia: ". . . mindful of the growing threat of discrimination in employ-
ment to our basic democratic traditions. .... "
27. Cincinnati, Cleveland, Philadelphia and Minneapolis.
28. See Detroit ordinance § 4, App. II. In one of the proposed drafts for St. Louis, the
provision is even more explicit. It requires that all contracts include ". . . a provision obli-
gating the contractor not to discriminate, directly or indirectly, through collective bargain-
ing contracts or otherwise. ...
"Section 3. The provisions of Section 2 hereof shall apply to all contracts of the City,
the performance of which by the contractor involves the employment of persons by such
contractor in the manufacture, conversion, repair, distribution or delivery of materials,
supplies, articles, equipment, utilities or services included in the contract of a value or price
exceeding $100.00 and to all subcontracts thereunder including all leases of property of the
City . . .granting the use of such property for any purpose contemplating the employment
of persons ..
29. See Chicago ordinance § 4, App. I. Only by reference to § 5, providing that "any
person, firm or corporation who shall violate, etc." does it appear that the word "person"
in § 4 includes more than private individuals.
[Vol. 56: 41
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tions, etc.30 Detroit specifies "all private employers having ten or more
employees engaged in a business" within the city as well as labor or-
ganizations and private employment agencies. 31 In Philadelphia, the
draftsmen, apparently on the theory that they were anchoring the ordi-
nance to firmer ground, provided that it should apply to all persons
enjoying stated benefits from the city.32 A number of the ordinances
exempt specified persons or groups.
33
Unfair employment practices. Here again the differences between the
various ordinances are principally in wording and in the degree of speci-
fication. The following are in essence the practices forbidden: discrimi-
nation against a person solely because of race, creed, color, national
origin or ancestry in regard to hire, tenure, promotion, terms or condi-
tions of employment, increases in compensation, or union membership;
adoption or enforcement of a rule or employment policy which dis-
criminates between employees on account of race, creed, color, etc.;
requirement of information from an applicant or employee concerning
his race, creed, color, etc. as a condition of employment; publication of
advertisements containing a specification or limitation as to race, creed,
color, etc.; assistance in, or incitement to, the commission of any of the
unfair employment practices forbidden by the ordinance.
Enforcement and Penalties. The vital enforcement and penalty provi-
sions are of two kinds: those which merely provide penalties for viola-
tion,34 and those which also create a commission with power to admin-
ister and seek compliance with the ordinance. 5
LEGALITY OF MuNIcIPAL ANTI-DISCRrMINATION ORDINANCES
The legal basis of municipal ordinances has given rise to much discus-
sicn. Whether a municipality may validly prohibit discriminatory em-
ployment practices has not been settled by any court of last resort.
30. Section 3 of the Philadelphia ordinance provides that "the term 'pers-on' includes
one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, labor unions, corporations, legal repre-
sentatives, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers."
31. App. II, §§ 2(4) and (6).
32. Philadelphia ordinance § 4(c): "Every person enjoying the use or benefit of any
franchise, license, permit, tax exemption, authorization, or other privilege granted by the
City of Philadelphia."
33. Cincinnati exempts sectarian, religious or fraternal organizations and ako any
person whose employees are in domestic service at his home. Detroit exempts employers of
fewer than 10 persons. See App. II, § 2(4). Philadelphia exempts employers of fewer than 6,
as well as religious and sectarian organizations. Minneapolis exempts employees in domestic
service and employees of a religious institution limited in membership to persons of a single
religious faith.
34. See Chicago ordinance § 5, App. I. This provision leaves enforcement of the ordi-
nance to the individual injured or to the prosecuting authorities of the city.
35. See Detroit ordinance §§ 6-8, App. II. The Minneapolis ordinance creates a five-
man commission with power to hear and investigate complaints.
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Some of the proposed ordinances have met with unfavorable opinions
from city attorneys, however, and many cities have delayed adoption
pending submission of drafts in more restricted form. Fear that an ad-
verse court decision on the validity of the ordinance might prejudice at-
tempts to secure a state law has also caused proponents of anti-discrimi-
nation legislation to approach municipal regulation cautiously.
The power of any municipality to enact legislation, no matter of what
nature, depends upon its charter, its enabling act, or the state constitu-
tion.36 A few cities enjoy broad "home rule" powers. The majority,
however, are subject to state statutes enumerating the specific powers
which a city may exercise, and in general the courts have held that a
city may exercise only those powers specifically granted." These are
basic limitations upon municipal, action. The discussion which follows
combines a consideration of the existence of the power to regulate em-
ployment practices with the objections raised to its exercise. 9
Public employment-Civil Service. Apparently little doubt is enter-
tained about the power of a municipality to apply anti-discrimination
regulations to employment practices of its own agents.40 In "home-
rule" cities there would probably be no need to spell out any specific
grant of power,4' and in other cities applicable authority can usually be
36. See 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. Rev. 1940), §§ 363, 367;
Brooklyn City R. R. v. Shalen, 191 App. Div. 737, 182 N. Y. S. 283 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 229
N. Y. 570, 128 N. E. 215 (1920); People v. Wolper, 350 Ill. 461,183 N. E. 451 (1932). Where
the state constitution authorizes adoption or amendment by a municipality of its own charter
the powers of the municipal corporation are derived from the constitution. St. Louis v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 149 U. S. 465 (1893). The Municipality is always a creature of the
state and has only such powers as the state confers upon it. The theory that a municipality
has an inherent right of self-government has been long-lived although it has never acquired
any substantial following. See (1930) 41 HARV. L. Rn-v. 894, 897.
37. WALKER, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS UPON MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE MAKING POWER
(1929) 10. The author points out that until recently most home-rule charters followed the
same practice. Now many charters grant the city power to exercise "all municipal func-
tions," which will necessitate court definition of the limits of that phrase. The Illinois gen-
eral charter for cities is an excellent example of the degree of control the state may retain.
See REVISED CITIES AND VILLAGES ACT, 24 ILL, STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1942) §1-1. See
also LEPAwsKy, HOME RULE FOR METROPOLITAN CHICAGO (1935) 1, and passim.
38. 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 98. People v. Wolper, 350
Il1. 461, 183 N. E. 451 (1932); Chicago Packing Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221 (1878). Failure of
the legislature to enumerate certain powers will preclude their exercise by the city. I Mc-
QUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. Rev. 1940) § 368; People ex rel Huntley Dairy
Co. v.-Village of Oak Park, 268 Ill. 256, 109 N. E. 11 (1915).
39. Generally the validity of an ordinance is challenged-as an unconstitutional as-
sumption of power-as being in conflict with constitutional provisions or with other state
laws.
40. "There are few matters so intimately and exclusively of municipal concern as the
mode of selecting persons for municipal employment. Possibly on this account there are few
cases in which the court is called on to discuss the right." McGOLDiuCK, LAW AND PRAC-
TICE OF MUNICIPAL HoME RULE (1933) 76.
41. Thus, for example, in Minnesota a city has all the powers of a civilian employer.
State v. McColl, 127 Minn. 155, 149 N. W. 11 (1914). In Markley v. St. Paul, 142 Minn.
[Vol. 56: 431
1947] REGULATION OF EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 439
found without difficulty. Even the restrictive Illinois Cities and Vil-
lages Act 42 grants the power to engage in public works,4 to control the
finances and property of the city,44 to make contracts,/ and "To pro-
vide by ordinance in regard to the relation between all municipal offi-
cers and employees in respect to each other, the municipality, and the
people." " These provisions or others of a similar nature clearly grant
the power to employ and, as an incident thereof, the power to prescribe
the conditions and manner of employment.
47
Attacks on the validity of municipal regulation of a city's own em-
ployment practices are therefore likely to be of a technical nature. The
argument may be advanced that the city council has no power to pre-
scribe rules of employment because the state civil service act applicable
to cities provides the method of appointment." Of course the council
would retain its powers so far as not granted to the state civil service
commission, and to this extent at least the ordinance would be valid.
But only a court blind to the policy of the civil service act would limit
the 6rdinance on so technical a ground, since the policy of the ordinance
coincides with that of the act.,4 "An ordinance making additional regu-
356, 172 N. IV. 215 (1919), it was held that neither the spirit nor the letter of the state
compensation act prevented a "home-rule" city from providing for additional comptnsa-
tion. In New York under the City Home Rule Law it is provided that: ". . . the local leg-
islative body of a city shall have power to adopt and amend ... (6) local laws in rd-ation
to the qualifications, number, mode of selection and removal . . . of all its officers and
employees... ." N. T. Cinr HomE RULE LAW § 11.
42. 24 ILL. STAT. AxN. (Smith-Hurd, 1942) Art. 23 "General Powers of the Corporate
Authorities" and Arts. 24 to 37 relating to special powers. Compare 16 Mo. R v. STAT.
ANN. (1943) §§ 6229, 6293.
43. 24 ILL. STAT. A-vx. (Smith-Hurd, 1942) § 58-1.
44. Id. § 23-2.
45. Id. § 2-9.
46. Id. § 23-98.
47. A city charter need not specifically grant the power to employ in order that such
power may exist. A city is deemed to have the power to do acts necessary to carry out its
other powers. 1 McQumL.N, MUNICIPAL CoRpoPmmT0os (2d ed. Rev. 1940) § 367.
48. The Illinois Act provides that no appointment shall be made to offices or places of
employment in the classified civil service except under and according to the rules promul-
gated by the Civil Service Commission. To this extent the act purports to qualify or restrict
the power of regulating employment. 24Y, ILL. STAT. Aw.n. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) §§ 41-2. Sze
People v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44, 49 N. E. 229 (1897).
Under home-rule laws the city is usually given power to provide the method of selecting
employees and thereby the power to establish a merit system. McGOLDrhCIr, LAW AND
PRAcTIcE OF MuNiIPAL HomE RULE (1933) 76. Under the provisions of the New York
City Home Rule Law quoted in note 41 supra, New York City has established a merit sys-
tem. See Nnw Yoax Crry CHARTER ANN. (1943) §§ 21, 811-S.
49. See People v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44, 60, 49 N. E. 229, 234 (1897). Most civil zervice
acts are set up to avoid favoritism in employment--a form of political rather than racial or
religious discrimination. Of necessity the employment practices provided for in such act-
are non-discriminatory. However, it should not be thought that the civil service acts have
thereby precluded racial or religious discrimination. Many of them contain a loophole,
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lations which are reasonable and consistent with the legislative regula-
tory act is not void as conflicting with the state law, for an ordinance
may duplicate or complement statutory regulations." 60
Public contracts-competitive bidding. A municipal corporation, like a
private corporation, has a general power to make contracts in further-
ance of the corporate objects, 5 and an implied power to make any con-
tract necessary to enable it to exercise the powers and perform the
duties conferred on it by law.52 Does it, like the federal 11 and state "1
governments, have the power to determine those with whom it will
deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make con-
tracts? If so, it may require all departments and contracting agencies
of the city to include in all contracts a provision requiring compliance
with the ordinance. 5 Again the answer turns upon the nature of the
city's charter. In home-rule cities the power has been held to be as
broad as that of the state.55 Even in cities under strict legislative con-
found in the provision which allows an appointing agency or department to choose one out
of a specified number of eligibles certified to it. See 24Y2 ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd,
1935) § 47. This situation has not escaped the attention of FEPC advocates. In Massachu-
setts, while a state FEPC law was under consideration, the following amendment was pro-
posed to the civil service law: "Sec. 15A. Discrimination against Eligibles in the Coinpeti-
tive Class. Whenever, in making appointment . . . from among those graded highest . . ,
(in examinations), an appointing officer shall appoint .. .any person graded lower than
any other person .. . (who might have been) . ..appointed .. .and who was willing
to accept such position . . . such appointing officer shall, within five days after making
such appointment . .. enter upon the records of his office a statement in writing of his
reasons for appointing .. . the person so appointed . .. and his reasons for failing to
appoint . .. the person . ..graded higher .. .and shall . . . transmit a copy of such
statement to the civil service commission, certifying .. . (that the statement is true and
that) . .. such selection was not made by reason of the race, color, religion or national
origin of any person so refused or given employment. Until such statement is filed .. .
accepted and approved by the civil service commission, the commission shall not approve
the salary, wage, or compensation of the person so employed or given employment." Com-
pare a similar act passed in New York which requires the person who has been discriminated
against to file a complaint rather than requiring an explanation from the appointing officer.
N. Y. CivIL SERV. LAW (McKinney, 1946) § 14-b-2.
50. 2 MCQUILLIN, MUNCIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. Rev. 1939) 699-700 and cases
cited. "The mere fact that the state in the exercise of the police power has made certain
regulations does not .. .prohibit a municipality from enacting additional requirements,"
Fox v. Racine, 225 Wis. 542, 545, 275 N. W. 513, 514 (1937).
51. 3 MCQUiLLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. Rev. 1943) § 1269.
52. People v. Spring Lake Dist., 253 Ill. 479, 97 N. E. 1042 (1912); Chicago v. Peck,
98 Ill. App. 434 (1900), aff'd, 196 Ill. 260, 63 N. E. 711 (1902).
53. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113 (1940).
54. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207 (1903).
55. See App. I, § 3 and App. II, § 4. /
56. Jahn v. Seattle, 120 Wash. 403, 207 Pac. 667 (1922). "The whole matter of provid-
ing public works being delegated to the city, the city has, as an incident of its power to con-
tract . . . the same inherent power to prescribe the conditions under which the work shall
be carried on within the city, in absence of any restriction by the state, that the state has,
and it may exercise .. . (such power) . . .until it is restricted by legislative enactment.
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trol such power should exist as an incident of the general power to con-
tract, 1 provided, of course, that it has not been proscribed by the state.
Many states do, however, impose an important limitation on the
municipality's power to prescribe the conditions of its contracts, namely
that the municipality may not make any requirement which will re-
strict competitive bidding." The purposes of this limitation are to
make sure the city obtains the lowest feasible prices and to minimize
favoritism and graft.59 It is entirely possible that some contractors
would abstain from bidding rather than abandon discriminatory em-
ployment policies. Should the FEP ordinance thus indirectly decrease
competition, it might increase the cost of city projects. If so, it is con-
ceivable that courts would hold that the public contracts clause of the
ordinance conflicted with the statutory competitive bidding require-
ment.6" In most cases, however, proof that the ordinance had increased
costs would be difficult to establish. Furthermore, the enlightened
judicial approach would be to recognize that the underlying purpose of
Milwaukee v. Raulf, 164 Wis. 172, 183-4, 159 N. W. 819, 822 (1916). Compare 2 McQum.-
LIN, M NIcIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. Rev. 1939) § 787 at 946 and cases cited.
57. Compare Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207 (1903). As an incident of its general power
to contract a city may insert such provisions as it deems necessary for the protection of the
public, e.g., the requirement of a contractor's bond even though no statute exprisly re-
iluires it. 2 DILLON, MuNICIPAL, CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 830.
58. See WIs. STAT. (1945) § 62.15 which requires contracts to be let to "the lowest
responsible bidder." See also 24 ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1942) §§ 19-76, 23-100.
The following are examples of provisions held to be restrictions on competitive bidding:
Specifications requiring a contractor to allow no laborer to work more than a certain number
of hours per day. Glover v. People, 201 Il1. 545, 66 N. E. 820 (1903); McChesney v. People,
200 Ill. 146, 65 N. E. 626 (1902). Contra: Milwaukee v. Raulf, 164 Wis. 172, 159 N. W. 819
(1916). The requirement that no alien labor be employed. Compare Doyle v. People, 207
Ill. 75, 69 N. E. 639 (1903). Requirement that the contractor pay a minimum wage. Hillig
v. St. Louis, 337 Io. 291, 85 S. W. (2d) 91 (1935); Bohn v. Salt Lahe City, 79 Utah 121,
8 P. (2d) 591, 81 A. L. R. 215 (1932). Contra: Iowa Elect. Co. v. Townm of Cascade, 227
Iowa 480, 28S N. W. 633 (1939); Wagner v. Milwaukee, 180 Wis. 640, 192 N. W1. 994 (1923).
Requirement that only union-made materials or union labor be used. Neal Publishing Co. v.
Rolph, 169 Cal. 190, 146 Pac. 659 (1915); Holden v. City of Alton, 179 Ill. 318, 53 N. E.
556 (1899). Contra: Amalithone Realty Co. v. New York, 162 N. Y. Misc. 715, 295 N. Y.
Supp. 423 (Sup. Ct. 1937). See RmX'NE, LABOR UNIONS AM MuNiICIPA . En1PLOYEE LAW
(1946) 65.
59. Hillig v. St. Louis, 337 Mo. 291,295, 85 S. XV. (2d) 91, 92 (1935).
60. The mere possibility of abstention from bidding because of an FEP ordinance
should not of itself compel the conclusion that cost has been increased. It has been held
that a clause prohibiting the employment of alien labor does not inv-aldate a contract or
special assessment in the absence of a showing that it was a factor in competition for the
contract. Doyle v. People, 207 Il. 75, 69 N. E. 639 (1903); Hamilton v. People, 194 Ill.
133, 62 N. E. 533 (1901). Logically, in order for the ordinance to be held a violation of the
charter provision requiring competition it should be shoivn that costs have increased and
that the plaintiff has thereby suffered damage. Ebbeson v. Board of Public Education,
18 Del. Ch. 37, 156 Ad. 286 (1931); Allen v. Labsap, 188 Mo. 692, S7 S. W. 926 (1905). But
cf. 2 DILLON, MuNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS (Sth ed. 1911) § 808.
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both the statutory provision and the ordinance is to further the public
interest.61 Indeed, most legislatures, by providing that contracts shall
be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, 2 have themselves recog-
nized that low cost does not by itself give full protection to the public's
best interests. 63 On balance, the public contracts clause would probably
stand up in court.
64
Private employment. The provisions regulating the employment prac-
tices of private employers 61 present the most difficult legal problems.
For that reason as well as the fact that they constitute the heart of
FEP legislation, these provisions are most subject to attack. In the ab-
sence of any specific grant of power, cities must base regulation of
private employment practices on the municipal police power granted
by the state constitution or legislature.
The scope of the police power, like that of other powers granted a
municipality, will depend on the nature of the grant.6 Cities which
derive their power from organic law may pass an ordinance as broad,
within its limitations, as any which the legislature may enact. How-
61. See (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 496, 497 to same effect.
62. See, e.g., 24 ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1942) § 19-76 ("lowest secure bld");
Wis. STAT. (1945) § 62.15. The city has a broad discretionary power in interpreting the
phrase "lowest responsible bidder." See West v. City of Oakland, 30 Cal. App, 556, 560,
159 Pac. 202, 204 (1916); cf. Note (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 149.
63. See Wagner v. Milwaukee, 180 Wis. 640, 192 N. W. 994 (1923). Lowest responsible
bidder does not mean the same as lowest possible cost; thus, a provision specifying patented
materials or articles has been held not to prevent competition, Hobart v. Detroit, 17 Mich.
246, 97 Am. Dec. 185 (1868), and Sanborn v. Boulder, 74 Colo. 358, 221 Pac, 1077 (1924),
where elimination of the provision would preclude the city from making use of new and
valuable inventions. The requirement of competitive bidding is only incidental to the main
purpose of protecting the public interest by securing the best advantages at the lowest prac-
tical price. 3 McQuILLUN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. Rev. 1943) § 1293.
64. The following statement indicates that the courts will consider the nature of an
ordinance provision which purportedly restricts competition: "(it must be shown) ...
that the provision restricting competition and having a tendency injurious to the public actu-
ally entered into the competition in some way." (Italics inserted.) McChesney v. People,
200 Ill. 146, 152, 65 N. E. 626, 628 (1902). It has been held that the courts will not interfere
where the conditions imposed allow reasonable opportunity for competition. See Hastings
Pavement Co. v. Cromwell, 67 N. Y. Misc. 212, 124 N, Y. S. 388 (1910). See 3 MCQUiLLiN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. Rev. 1943) § 942 pointing out that the police power may
be used to protect economic interests; and City of Fernandina v. State, 143 Fla. 802, 197 So.
454 (1940). But cf. Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P. (2d) 591, 81 A. L. R. 215, 255
(1932).
It has been suggested that public welfare statutes might logically be construed as con-
ferring power on municipalities to insert provisions in contracts which are solely for the ad-
vancement of the public welfare, e.g., the relief of local unemployment, without regard to
the effect on bidding. Note (1932) 81 A.L.R. 255 at p. 256.
65. App. I, §§ 4-5, and App. II, § 2(4)-(6).
66. See note 36, supra.
67. Seattle v. Rogers, 6 Wash. (2d) 31, 106 P. (2d) 598, 130 A. L. R. 1498 (1940);
Dayton v. S. S. Kresge Co., 114 Ohio St. 624, 151 N. E. 775, 53 A. L. R. 916, 920 (1926);
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ever, where the power is drawn from the legislature, it is confined within
narrower limits.65 In states where the municipality is given power to
'legislate upon certain subjects in a specifically limited manner, and
there is also a general power to enact ordinances for the general welfare,
etc., the latter power is generally limited to measures in furtherance of
the other powers which are specifically enumerated." However, the
courts of at least one jurisdiction, Minnesota, have rejected so narrow a
construction."0
If, in a particular state, it is doubtful that a city can regulate private
employment practices under such general grants as the power to regu-
late in the interest of the public welfare, to license,71 or to enact police
regulations, efforts should be made to secure passage of a state enabling
Brougher v. Board of Public Works, 205 Cal. 426, 271 Pac. 487 (1928). Note (1939) 5 LEGAL
NoTEs ON Loc.L Gov'T. 75-6.
68. The state of "legal infancy" to which cities may be confined is illustrated by Chi-
cago's position. See LEPAWSKY, HOME RULE FOR METROrOLITAN CHlCAGO (1935), PaSSim.
See also Chicago Law Department, 1940 REPORT, HoME RULE, passim. More recently the
trend has been to accord wider discretion to municipal authorities in the exercise of the
police power in the public interest. 3 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPaL CoorLOtnT/oNS (2d ed. Rev.
1943) 116 and cases cited.
69. See Birmingham v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 216 Ala. 178, 112 So. 742 (1927). In
City of Bloomington v. Wirrick, 381 Ill. 347, 353-4,45 N. E. (2d) 852, 856 (1942), this rule
is clearly stated: the police power delegated to the city "relates solely to the enforcement of
ordinances and regulations passed . .. under powers conferred by other provisions of the
statute. It confers no additional powers and cannot be invoked as an independent source of
legislative power." It is intended only to carry out other powers properly delegated.
Often the enumeration of those businesses and occupations over which the municipality
has been given control serves to exclude control over all others. See State v. Reeve, 104
Fla. 196, 139 So. 817, 79 A. L. R. 1119, 1126 (1932); Barnard & Miller v. Chicago, 316 Ill.
519, 147 N. E. 384, 38 A. L. R. 1533, 1538 (1925).
70. In Duluth v. Cerveny, 218 Minn. 511, 517, 16 N. IV. (2d) 779, 783 (1944), the
court said:
"A city exercises police power within its jurisdiction to practically the same extent as
the State itself. This power is not confined to the narrow limits of precedents based on condi-
tions of a past era. Rather, it is a power which changes to meet changing conditions, which
call for revised regulations to promote the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the
public."
And in State ex rel Remick v. Clousing, 205 Minn. 296, 285 N. W. 711, 123 A. L. R. 465,
471 (1939), it was determined that the "general welfare" clause of the city charter was not
limited to a subsequent enumeration of subjects which the city was authorized to regulate.
To same effect see Century Brewing Co. v. Seattle, 177 Wash. 579, 32 P. (2d) 1009 (1934);
Milwaukee v. Raulf, 164 Wis. 172, 159 N. AV. 819 (1916).
71. The power to license particular businesses is usually set forth in a specific and often
narrowly construed grant to a city. However, the possibility that the licensing power could
be used to aid in securing compliance with an FEPC should be explored in terms of the laws
of each state. A similar suggestion has been made with respect to civil rights laws. S-e
Gertz, Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws Through Municipal Licensing Power (1946) 4 Nut.
B. J. 43. Although the author sets forth adequate arguments upon which the use of the
licensing power as an enforcement measure can be justified, he fails to give any legal basis
for his reasoning.
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act. The act should specifically empower any municipality to regulate
discriminatory employment practices. By this device, all doubt as to
the power of a municipality to pass an ordinance would be eliminated.
In view of the strictness with which municipal powers are habitually
construed, it would also be wise for the act to authorize the creation of
city enforcement commissions. 72 A provision of this type would conform
to the pattern sometimes followed with regard to civil service, health
and building regulations where, in addition to defining specifically a
city's power to regulate a subject, the acts provide for creation of local
enforcement bodies. While such statutes have usually been limited to
large cities, they could easily be made applicable to all municipalities
at their option.
To date no state has tried this approach. It would, however, provide
a practical solution where passage of a state FEP act is not politically
feasible. Legislators who claim that their constituents oppose a fair
employment practices bill should have no objection to an act which
merely permits communities which do favor such legislation to adopt it.
Moreover, even where it is possible to obtain a state FEP act, enabling
provisions should be included in it so that state action may be but-
tressed by local action.
Often the attack on municipal police ordinances is based not on lack
of municipal authority but on violation of the constitutional require-
ments of due process.73 Municipal legislation is subject to the prohibi-
tions of both the state and federal constitutions, and violation of the
due process clause by a police measure raises the same questions under
both constitutions. 4 In general, if a police ordinance seeks to attain
objectives which a government may legally effect, and if it is not un-
reasonable or arbitrary in the means adopted, the due process clause
will not invalidate it. More specifically, it has been contended that a
fair employment practice law violates due process because it infringes
on freedom of contract.
75
This argument is unsound in view of decisions upholding regulation
of employment for the protection of society "against the evils which
72. The Detroit ordinance (App. II) and Minneapolis ordinance make provision for a
limited type of enforcement body.
73. McGOLDRIcK, THE LAW & PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOmE RuLE, (1933) 332. For
this reason there is often difficulty in distinguishing between the extent of the police power
in home rule and other cities.
74. See Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306, 318, 265 Pac. 246 (1928), and McCoy v. Kenosha.
County, 195 Wis. 273, 277, 218 N. W. 348 (1928) to the effect that "due process" has like
meaning under both state and federal constitutions.
75. This contention is considered in Dublirer, Legislation Outlawing Ra~ial Discrimina.
tion in Employment (1945) 5 LAw. GuiLD REV. 101, 108 and Note (1945) 19 ST. JouN's
L. REv. 170, 175. Although the contention is there considered in its application to federal
and state FEP laws, it would, if valid, apply equally to municipal legislation.
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menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people." ' Free-
dom of contract does not mean that one may conduct a business in
derogation of the public interest?7 The state 78 or its subdivisions 71
may exercise the police power to eradicate an evil shown to threaten
the public welfare. That discriminatory employment practices harmful
to the public may be regulated is illustrated by decisions holding that
the Wagner Act prohibits discriminatory refusal to hire on the sole
basis that the applicants have union records." If we can validly outlaw
such discriminatory employment practices in order to insure industrial
peace, afortiori we can outlaw similar practices which threaten not only
the public peace but also our economic and social welfare. Courts in
recent years have made many statements which indicate a belief that
discrimination because of race, creed, or color is against public pol-
icy.8' That fact being accepted, there can remain no doubt but that the
matter is subject to the police power.
76. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937), and the numerous deci-
sions following the opinion in this case.
77. See Nebbia v. People, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
78. That the state may so exercise its police power is too clear to merit argument. See
Nebbia v. People, 291 U. S. 502 (1934), cited supra note 77; State Board of Milk Control v.
Newark Milk Co., 118 N. J. Eq. 504, 179 Ad. 116 (1935).
79. Bowers v. North Little Rock, 190 Ark. 175, 77 S. IV. (2d) 797 (1935); Grown v.
Cleveland, 125 Ohio St. 455, 181 N. E. 897, 84 A. L. R. 708, 714 (1932); Columbia v. Phillips,
101 S. C. 391, 85 S. E. 963 (1915).
80. NLRB v. Vaumbec Mills, 114 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Nevada Consoli-
dated Copper Corp., 26 NLRB 1182 (1940); but cf. NLRB v. Nevada Consolidated Cop-
per Corp., 316 U_ S. 105 (1942); see also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177 (1941)
(to effectuate the policy of the act, employer required to offer employment to men he refused
to hire because of their union affiliations); Bernhardt, The Right to a Job (1945) 30 ConN.
L. Q. 292, 304, 305 and cases cited therein.
81. "Race discrimination by an employer may reasonably be deemed more unfair and
less excusable than discrimination against workers on. the ground of union affiliation."
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 561 (1938).
"The Constitution voices its disapproval whenever economic discrimination is applied
under authority of law against any race, creed or color. A sound democracy cannot allow
such discrimination to go unchallenged. Racism is far too virulent today to permit the
slightest refusal, in the light of a Constitution that abhors it, to expose and condemn it
wherever it appears in the course of a statutory interpretation." Murphy, J. concurring in
Steele v. Louisville & N. R. R., 323 U. S. 192, 209 (1944).
"A judicial determination that such legislation [i.e., legislation prohibiting a labor or-
ganization from discriminating against any person because of race, creed or color violated
the Fourteenth Amendment would be a distortion of the policy manifested in that amend-
ment, which was adopted to prevent state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination
on the basis of race or color. We see no constitutional basis for the contention that a state
cannot protect workers from exclusion solely on the basis of race, color or creed by an organi-
zation, functioning under the protection of the state, which holds itself out to represent the
general business needs of the employees." Railway Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 93-4 (1945).
See also concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J., 326 U. S. 88, 97-8: "Of course a State may
leave abstention from such discriminations to the conscience of individuals. On the other
hand, a State may choose to put its authority behind one of the cherished aims of American
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The due process clause serx es as a last refuge for most opposition to
regulatory measures. As a general rule the courts are more likely to
invalidate as unreasonable those ordinances passed under general, im-
plied, or incidental powers than those passed in conformity with an ex-
press grant.8 2 FEP ordinances, so far as the clauses regulating private
employment practices are concerned, fall within the former group, for
they involve an exercise of the general police power in the interest of
the general welfare. 3 It is important, therefore, that careful attention
be given-to drafting the policy clause of the ordinance." The clause
should set forth the purpose and social necessity for the measures, so
that the ordinance itself will provide a basis for judging its reasonable-
ness. This, together with the extensive material which can be compiled
to show the evil effects of discrimination, should make it difficult suc-
cessfully to attack the ordinance as arbitrary or unreasonable." Deci-
sions as to the necessity and efficacy of an ordinance are for the city's
legislative body," and should not be questioned by the courts if there is
reasonable relation between the action taken and the evil sought to be'
remedied.87
Enforcement--municipal administrative bodies. Some of the existing
and proposed ordinances make violation a crime, but leave enforcement
proceedings to be initiated by the cities' regular prosecuting authori-
ties.8 There is little doubt of the validity of this type of provision, for
a city may always prescribe a penalty for violation of an ordinance and
charge the proper officials with enforcement. 9 However, the effective-
feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious prejudice to another's hurt. To use
the Fourteenth Amendment as a sword against such state power would stultify that Amend-
ment."
82. 2 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1939) 864 e seq. This is further
'reason for an enabling clause.
83. Compare Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U. S. 365, 386 (1926). The court establishes
the principle that ordinances passed under the police power cannot be declared unconstitu-
tional unless their provisions "are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Id. at 395.
84. The policy clause in the Detroit ordinance is well drawn and should fulfill its pur-
pose. See App. II.
85. In determining whether an ordinance is unreasonable the courts consider the ob.
jects sought to be attained and the necessity for its adoption. See Biffer v. Chicago, 278 111.
562, 116 N. E. 182 (1917); Los Angeles Co. v. Hollywood Cemetery Ass'n, 124 Cal. 344,
57 Pac. 153 (1899).
86. Cleaners Guild of Chicago v. Chicago, 312 II1. App. 102, 37 N. E. (2d) 857 (1941);
Bond v. Cooke, 237 App. Div. 229, 262 N.'Y. Supp. 199 (3d Dep't 1932); Sverkerson v.
Minneapolis, 204 Minn. 388, 283 N. W. 555, 120 A. L. R. 944, 950 (1939).
87. Chicago v. Waters, 363 Ill. 125, 1 N. E. (2d) 396 (1936). This relationship should,
of course, be made clear in the policy clause.
88. See App. I, § 5.
89. State v. Parker, 87 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260 (1924); State v. Wong Hing, 176 Minn.
151, 222 N. W. 639 (1929); see 2 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. Rev.
1939) § 747.
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ness of such a provision in legislation of this type is open to serious
doubt. State civil rights laws make discrimination in public places of
amusement or accommodation a criminal offense punishable by fine
and imprisonment." These laws have proved universally ineffective,91
and their failure may be traced directly to the inadequate enforcement
provisions.9 2 The burden of making a complaint falls upon the person
discriminated against, and even if complaint is made, the chances of
prosecution are small. Public prosecutors regard this type of case as
comparatively minor, and since the offenders frequently represent
prominent business interests, it is often considered politically wise to
avoid pressing such matters. Also, convictions are hard to obtain be-
cause even the sympathetic prosecutor, when hampered by lack of ade-
quate investigatory facilities, finds it hard to prepare an airtight case.
All too often the aggrieved persons, recognizing these facts, vill suffer
the injury rather than pursue a fruitless complaint. 93
Prevention rather than punishment after the event should be a pri-
mary purpose of any fair employment practices law. Positive results
achieved through administrative action are more effective in this regard
than the negative approach of a court-enforced penalty.94 What is
90. See Legislative Attempts to Eliminate Racial and Religious Discrimination (1939)
39 COL. L. REv. 986, 996, for statutory references. Many of these statutes also provide
damages or a statutory penalty to be obtained in a civil suit by the person aggrieved.
91. Id. at 1002; Maslow, supra note 14 at 76.
92. Ibid.
93. Provision for damages or a penalty to be given the injured party does not increase
the number of criminal complaints filed or civil suits brought. The burden of a lawsuit out-
weighs the small recovery usually allowed, and even if no limit was set on recovery, the
difficulty of proving damages would deter action.
94. See CLEARING HousE RELEASE No. 24, AmERiCAN CouNc. ON RMcE Rnj-%roxS,
FEPC (June 26, 1946) Summary and Conclusion 4-11.
"FEPC during its five years satisfactorily settled nearly 5,000 cases by peaceful negotia-
tion, including 40 strikes caused by racial differences. During the last year of the war,
FEPC held 15 public hearings and docketed a total of 3,485 cases, settling 1,191 of them.
These settlements were not publicized and generally escaped attention. The contrary im-
pression, that FEPC normally met with unyielding opposition, was created by the compara-
tively few difficult cases which received emphasis through public hearings and public ex-
pressions of defiance by some recalcitrant employers and unions.
"In fact, the bulk of FEPC's useful work was accomplished by the quiet persuasion of
its regional representatives assigned to 15 regional and subregional offices located in major
industrial centers.
"That is not to say that persuasion alone can end discrimination. The employer's need
for war workers, or his patriotism, or dislike of exposure, each in its respective situation vs
a powerful incentive to stop discrimination. The practice, however, seldom disappeared
spontaneously. The intervention of a third party with authority to act if necesary, was
required to start the process in motion ....
"The public hearing is an essential step toward the ending of discrimination where ne-
gotiation has failed. Dislike of public exposure of their intolerant actions is a stimulant to
move the indifferent or the timid into taking the first steps by which workers of different
racial or religious backgrounds may be brought together to work in harmony."
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needed-and has been provided by some of the ordinances-is an ad-
ministrative body with regulatory and protective functions specifically
designed for the problem. 5 Such a body, hearing complaints 11 and
making routine investigations of concerns subject to the ordinance,
would be in a position to formulate uniform standards for the type of
case that it will consider. Employers desiring to comply with the ordi-
nance could refer proposed rules and regulations to the commission for
approval or suggested modification. A commission could also effectively
use conciliation and mediation in those situations where discrimination
is either unknown to top management or is an unconscious carry-over
of a community pattern. Finally, a commission may formulate and
carry out an educational program for the elimination of discriminatory
practices. This program could include publicity campaigns against
violators.98 Very few individuals or firms would be insensitive to publi-
cation of the fact that they are engaged in discriminatory practices."
95. See App. II. §§ 5-8.
"The inadequacies of the old procedures to meet the new claims, the lack of any power
in the judicial branch of government to initiate proceedings, the delays attendant upon
formalism, the want of that type of specialized application that makes for expertness, these
are the basic causes for administrative law. Its creation, like the creation of the older equity,
was an effort to grant protection to the common man in the realization of new liberties born
of a new economic order. The continuity of the common man's radio programs, the security
of his bank deposits, his protection against unfair discrimination in employment, his right
to have light and power at reasonable rates . . .' -to mention only a few of the necessities
of modern life-these are some of the new liberties which make up the right of today's com-
mon man to the pursuit of happiness, and these liberties for their protection today seek the
administrative and not the judicial process." Landis, The Development of the Administrative
Commission, quoted in GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTs (1940) 18.
96. Although none of the proposed ordinances which make provision for a commission
is patterned after state FEP acts such as that in New York, it is of interest to note that the
state acts have been weakened because of their failure to provide that the organized repre-
sentatives of minority groups may file complaints with the state commigsion. See Comment,
"Persons Aggrieved" Under the Ives-Quinn Law (1946) 6 LAW. GUILD REv. 421.
97. See Pesin, Summary, Analysis and Comment on 'Anti-Discrimination' or 'Fair
Employment Practices' Legislation of New Jersey (1945) 68 N. J. L. J. 217. In Chicago the
1945 Report of the Mayor's Committee on Race Relations (at 11) recommended that the
FEP ordinance be strengthened by the inclusion of some enforcement machinery.
98. One of the ordinances proposed in St. Louis (Board Bill No. 45) which pertained
primarily to city contracts provided: Sec. 5 . . . "If upon such informal investigation a
majority of the commission finds there is reasonable cause to believe that there has been such
violation of the provisions of this ordinance, the Commission shall have authority, upon due
notice to any contractor complained of, of the time and place of hearing of such complaint to
make a finding of violation by such contractor . . . and shall make a report to the Mayor
. . . of any such violation and publicize the same. .. "
99. The first prosecutibn under the Chicago ordinance was an excellent example of the
coercive power of publicity. In Chicago v. M. Wenzler (May, 1946) as reported in tie files
of the American Council on Race Relations, the defendant's attorney took great pains to
state that the defendant (personnel director of a corporation whose product was nationally
advertised and distributed) had no desire to discriminate against the complainant or any
members of his race, maintaining that no discrimination was intended against the complain.
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Granting the desirability of a commission for the administration of
FEP ordinances, has a municipality the power to create such a body?
This problem needs careful consideration. Most inquiry into the legal
aspects involved has been devoted to state and federal bodies. The
briefest review of the structure of government in nearly all cities will
reveal the presence of administrative bodies such as building commis-
sions and boards of health and sanitation which have a more vital and
direct effect upon the city-dweller than do many federal and state ad-
ministrative bodies. Some of these municipal bodies are direct crea-
tures of the state legislature; others are creatures of the city council.
In dealing with the latter type the courts have constantly overlooked
the fact that the legislative power of most cities is a delegated power;
instead they have treated it as if it stemmed from constitutional
grant, as in the case of state legislative power. Thus the following type
of erroneous analysis continues to exist: Since a city council is subject to
the same prohibition against delegation as the legislature, "I the council
cannot delegate the exercise of its powers to other municipal officers,
administrative officials, or to its own committees.10' In the language of
the courts, it is the power to exercise discretion as to what the law shall
be which cannot be delegated.10 2 This is to be distinguished from a
delegation of power which involves authority or discretion as to the exe-
cution of a law. 0 3 In the latter case, ministerial or administrative
powers are granted, and they may be validly delegated. 10 4 These dis-
tinctions are tenuous, because the content of a law is often determined
ant and that the case arose out of a misunderstanding concerning complainant's true inten-
tions with respect to the job she sought. The court suggested that as proof of his good faith
and desire to abide by the ordinance, the defendant offer to hire the complainant. To this
the defendant readily agreed, and the case was dismissed. Apart from illustrating the de-
fendant's desire to avoid the contention that it subscribed to a policy of discrimination, the
case also illustrated the desirability of a commission, for if defendant were sincere in his con-
tention of a misunderstanding, an attempt at mediation by a commission would surely have
brought that fact out before the case reached the prosecution stage. If defendant actually
maintained discriminatory employment practices, publicity by the commission plus the
threat of further publicity in a court prosecution would have brought a quicker settlement.
100. Ill. Power and Light Corp. v. City of Centralia, 11 F. Supp. 874 (E. D. Ill. 1935)
(see especially review of Ill. decisions at 886-7), rcv'd, 89 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937);
Ex pare Kinney, 53 Cal. App. 792, 200 Pac. 966 (1921); People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17
N. XV. (2d) 193 (1945); State ec rd. City of Excelsior Springs v. Smith, 336 Mo. 1104, 82
S. XV. (2d) 37 (1935); State ex rd. Srigley v. Woodworth, 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N. E. 713
(1929).
101. 1 MCQUmLLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs (2d ed. Rev. 1940) § 395 and cases cited
for various jurisdictions.
102. State ex red. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 291, 221 N. NV. 860, 863 (1928); Minne-
apolis Gas-Light Co. v. Minneapolis, 36 Minn. 159, 30 N. W. 450 (1886).
103. State ex re. City of Excelsior Springs v. Smith, 336 Mo. 1104, 82 S. W. (2d) 37
(1935).
104. Jewell Belting Co. v. Bertha, 91 Minn. 8, 11,97 N. NV. 424,425 (1903); Carthage v.
Garner, 209 Mo. 688, 108 S. IV. 521 (1908). The fundamental weakness of this distinction
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by the way it is carried into effect, and for this very reason the courts
have required that definite standards be provided for the administra-
tion of a law in order that it avoid invalidity as a grant of legislative
power. 
0 5
More accurately defined, the problem is one of sub-delegation of legis-
lative powers. The totality of the law-making power is in the state
legislature, and only through delegation of such power is a municipality
empowered to enact oidinances. 10 The character of the problem thus
changes from that of a constitutional question to one of statutory inter-
pretation. 1 Whichever approach is used, it seems that at one point or
another the courts will return to the question of discretionary versus
non-discretionary powers.' Too often the tendency in drafting these
ordinances is to prohibit discrimination without defining what discrimi-
nation is. It is quite likely that use of such a term or similar terms may
lead to a successful attack on the ordinance on the ground that the term
is so broad as to leave to the administrative officer who deals with the
problem, or to the courts, the definition of the type of offence which the
ordinance seeks to prohibit. This problem can be minimized by a care-
fully drawn definition which specifies certain types of conduct as con-
stituting discrimination.
Long-standing practice in all communities supports the statement
that a city council may appoint administrative agents to carry out its
is brilliantly expressed by Ernst Freund, Power of Zoning Boards of Appeals to Grant Varia-
tions (1931) 20 NAT. MUN. REV. 5$7. See also remarks of Judge Rosenberry in State ex rel.
Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 496, 498, 506, 220 N. W. 929, 938,
939, 942 (1928).
105. City of Pekin v. Industrial Commission, 341 Ill. 312, 173 N. E. 339 (1930); Poggel v.
Louisville Ry., 225 Ky. 784, 10 S. W. (2d) 305 (1928); State v. Lindquist, 171 Minn. 334,
214 N. W. 260 (1927).
An ordinance which contains no rules or provisions limiting an officer's discretion is
void. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); People v. Sholem, 294 Ill. 204, 128 N. E.
377 (1920); Fred Wolferman Bldg. Co. v. General Outdoor Adv. Co., 30 S. W. (2d) 137
(Mo. App. 1930).
106. Weeks, Legislative Power versus Delegated Legislative Power (1937) 25 GEo. L. J.
314, 331. The effect of the early doctrine that a municipality has a right of self-government
has been to insure that delegation of legislative power to a municipality will not be invali-
dated under the general rule. See 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed, 1943)
59-60.
107. See also McGOLDRICx, BUILDING REGULATION i NEW YORK CnTY (1944) 185:
"A somewhat different problem is raised by the extensive and complicated series of sub-
delegations of power which are inherent in the New York City building law system, Evbry
agency other than the State legislature is a party to this process. When the city council
confers power on a commissioner it is sub-delegating; and when the commissioner assigns
duties and powers to subordinates, he is sub-delegating. The question which arises is
whether the sub-delegating party has the power to so sub-delegate. Sub-delegation is not a
constitutional problem but is entirely a question of statutory interpretation."
108. See SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 106, at 72-4.
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laws.' Having prescribed the scope of the subject matter, it may
create committees or boards which have power to make investigations,
to gather information, and to make reports and recommendations. 110
The authority to promulgate rules and regulations, and to make deter-
minations of fact necessary to effectuate the operation and enforcement
of an ordinance "I may also be delegated to administrative boards or
officials. An ordinance which defines what activities are prohibited may
validly delegate to an administrative official the authority to determine
when its provisions are being violated.
1 1 2
In the Detroit ordinance, for example, the unfair employment prac-
tices which are forbidden are specified.113 There is no leeway for the
commission to broaden the definition 114 except as some expansion is
inherent in the interpretation process. It has the power only to deter-
mine when the defined practices exist "5 and not what they shall be.
The commission's power to make rules and regulations is limited to
those found necessary to carry out the functions of the commission and
the purposes of the ordinance."1  Ordinances granting power to the
police to adopt rules and regulations to effectuate the express purpose
109. State ex rd. Campbell v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 97 Ohio St. 283,119 N. E. 735 (1918);
Storey v. Seattle, 124 Wash. 508, 215 Pac. 514 (1923).
110. Dancer v. Mannington, 50 IV. Va. 322, 40 S. E. 475 (1901); Burlington v. Denni-
son, 42 N. J. L. 165 (1880). See Biddeford v. Yates, 104 Me. 506, 72 At. 335 (1908).
111. Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U. S. 486 (1916); Evanston v. WVazau,
364 Ill. 198, 4 N. E. (2d) 78, 106 A. L. R. 789, 795 (1936); State ex rel. City of Excelior
Springs-v. Smith, 336 Mo. 1104, 82 S. IV. (2d) 37 (1935).
112. "For the proper enforcement of its ordinance the city legislative body may delegate
a power to an officer to determine some fact or state of things upon which the ordinance
makes or intends to make its own action depend." Borum v. Braham, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 331,
336, 40 P. (2d) 866, 868 (1935). Moy v. Chicago, 309 I1. 242, 140 N. E. 845 (1923); Fred
Wolferman Bldg. Co. v. General Outdoor Adv. Co., 30 S. IV. (2d) 157 (Mo. App. 1930).
113. App. II, § 7(c). This section expressly subjects action under this power to ap-
proval by the council. However, just as the council's rule-making power is subject to judi-
cial review on the question of reasonableness, so too would be the action of its agent.
114. The use of the word discrimination in the Detroit ordinance follows that in the
Wagner Act, which provides, that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "By
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ... ." 49 SrAT. 452
(1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158(c) (1940). The courts have not found difficulty in construction of
discrimination in this section. See cases cited in note 80 supra. It should also be noted that
in the Detroit ordinance, as in the Wagner Act, the word "discrimination" is used in defining
more exactly the prohibited "unfair practices." This avoids the difficulty that would arise
from a broad prohibition of discrimination in employment because of race, creed, color or
religion.
115. App. II, § 8. The unfair practices are already defined and the commissioa is limited
by that definition.
116. It is expressly provided that the Commission shall "make such rules and regulations,
subject to approval by the Common Council, as may be necessary to carry out the functions
of the commission and achieve the purpose of this ordinance."
451 11
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of an ordinance have been upheld." 7 It would seem to follow that the
Detroit commission's rule-making power, with the limitation just noted,
should also be upheld. Should that power be questioned, however, the
ordinance contains a further safeguard-all rules and regulations made
by the commission are subject to approval of the council."' 8 Any ques-
tion of delegation arising by reason of the rule-making power should be
obviated by this limitation, which in effect makes all rules and regula-
tions those of the council itself.
Although the Detroit commission is authorized to make determina-
tions of fact," 9 its findings are not binding. Upon finding any person in
violation of the ordinance the commission may certify the case to the
city for prosecution. Therefore there is no need to provide for judicial
review of the commission's findings of fact, since any finding binding
upon the defendant will have to be made by the court.2 0 Where pos-
sible,' 2 ' it would be desirable that the commission be empowered to
make a conclusive finding as to the question of violation.
Probably of even greater value would be the power to seek compli-
ance with the ordinance through the commission's own enforcement
staff. Experience in federal legislation has shown that an act whose en-
forcement has been left to a general enforcement agency never attains
the degree of effectiveness achieved when enforcement is conferred
upon the body whose main duty is to administer the particular law.*2
However, the absence of such powers does not detract from the desira-
bility of a commission, nor will it seriously impair its workability. The
very important work of investigation, mediation, and conciliation
would alone justify the existence of a commission. Of extreme impor-
tance is the ability of the commission to aid the city attorney in secur-
117. Taylor v. Roberts, 84 Fla. 654, 94 So. 874 (1922). See also Borum v. Graham,
4 Cal. App. (2d) 331, 40 P. (2d) 866 (1935).
118. See note 116 supra.
119. App. II, § 8.
120. In Tighe v. Osborne, 150 Md. 452, 133 AtI. 465, 46 A. L. R. 80, 88 (1926), the court
held that a municipality may validly provide for an appeal from the determination by an
administrative agency of questions of law only, quoting from an earlier decision. " 'And
while it [the ordinance] provided for no appeal from the decisions of such agencies upon issues
of facts, nevertheless persons aggrieved thereby would not be injured because if such deci-
sions were unreasonable, arbitrary, or oppressive, they could be reviewed and corrected upon
application to a court of chancery'." Id. at 464-5, 133 Ati. at 469.
121. If the ordinance does specifically provide that there is a right of appeal, there should
be no doubt that the council has the power to make the commission's finding of fact conclu-
sive. Then in the prosecution for violation of the ordinance the only question the defendant
could raise as to the facts would be that the commission's finding was arbitrary and unrea-
sonable. If there were substantial evidence of a probative nature to support the finding, the
court would be bound to accept it even though it might have found to the contrary.
122. Compare, e.g., the experience under Sec. 7(a) of the NIRA, 48 STAT. 199 (1933),
with that under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 201-19
(1940).
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ing convictions by implementing his case with information and facts
which he has neither the time nor facilities to secure.
For some cities, especially those with a relatively small population,
the greatest problem in creating a commission may be budgetary rather
than legal. In such event a possible solution may be to provide for the
appointment of members who will serve without compensation. In view
of the large number of public-spirited citizens who have freely given
time and energy to the various committees on human relations estab-
lished in many cities during recent years, there should be no dearth of
volunteers.
CONCLUSIONS
While it is true that discrimination in employment is of national con-
cern, 123 the problem is particularly acute in urban centers. -1 24 Because
state officials often come from rural areas and frequently are not aware
of the magnitude of the discrimination problems of the city, it is both
proper and desirable that local authorities be charged with the solution
of this problem just as they have been with the solution of other urban
problems.
25
In drafting an FEP ordinance, specific and general grants of power
by the legislature to municipalities should be carefully examined and
evaluated. Where doubt exists as to the power of the municipality to
enact an ordinance, effort should be directed towards obtaining the
passage of a state law specifically enabling the municipality so to act,
and where a state fair employment practice law is sought, it should in-
clude such an enabling clause to encourage local action. However,
unless the trend of decisions in a particular state has been especially
narrow in interpreting the extent of municipal power, an effective fair
employment practices ordinance can be drafted which would w,.ithstand
attack in the courts. Such an ordinance should provide for an adminis-
trative agency to make possible the use of educational and persuasive
techniques and to aid in effective enforcement; but where an adminis-
123. See FIRST REPORT OF F.E.P.C. (Gov't Printing Office 1945) 43, exposing the ex-
tent of discrimination in industries such as railroads, shipbuilding, oil, aircraft, seafaring,etc.
124. 65 U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNiTED STATEs
(1943) 139. Chart No. 138, showing the average number of persons in farm work, discloses
that only 2,406,000 out of a total of 10,263,000 farm workers in 1943 were hired; see also
Chart No. 129 on p. 119, classifying by industry the number of persons employed in rural,
rural-nonfarm, and rural-farm groups.
125. In respect to city and state licensing systems, "It is no doubt true that few inspec-
tion services, city or state, are perfect, but in Chicago, state inspection is far too infrequent.
- . . In spite of the hazards of political favoritism, city inspection generally means expert
regulation, and it works well in many fields where the public health and safety is seriously
involved. In any case, it is superior to state regulation, which almost invariably lacks the
essence of a good inspectional system, that is, a skilled inspection personnel." LEPwssy,
Hosru RULE FOR MIETROPOLITAN CHICAGO (1935) 35-6.
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trative agency is provided, special care must be used in drafting stand-
ards for the guidance of the agency, in order to avoid the pitfall of in-
valid delegation of legislative power.
A municipal ordinance directed at employment discrimination should
not be considered merely as a substitute for a state law,"' but as sup-
plementing the state law just as the latter would complement the pro-
posed federal law. The possibility of concerted action on all levels of
government offers real hope that legislation can eliminate discrimina-
tion.
126. An ordinance may duplicate or complement statutory regulations, 2 MCQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d Ed. Rev. 1939) 699-700 and cases cited, State legislation
does not preclude municipal police regulations on the same subject. See Note (1940) 7 U. oF
CHI. L. REv. 388, 389-90. Johnson v. Great Falls, 38 Mont. 369, 99 Pac. 1059 (1909);
Evanston v. Wazau, 364 Ill. 198, 4 N. E. (2d) 78, 106 A. L. R. 789 (1936) (a municipality
may exercise power concurrently with the state).
APPENDIX I
The Chicago Ordinance passed August 21, 1945, reads as follows:
Providing for cooperation with the Federal Government agencies in preventing dis.
crimination on account of race, color, or creed; prohibiting city and private employers from
making such discriminations; and declaring criminal penalties for violations thereof.
Be it Ordained by the City Council of the City of Chicago:
Section 1. Whereas, it is the policy of the United States Government in furtherance
of the successful winning of the peace to insure the maximum participation of all available
workers in production, regardless of race, creed, color or national origin, in the firm belief
that the democratic way of life within the nation can be defended successfully only with the
help and support of all groups within its borders, the City of Chicago, to cooperate with the
United States Government, by eliminating possible discrimination in public and private
employment, enacts this ordinance to be known as the Fair Employment Practices Ordi-
nance.
Section 2. It shall be unlawful for any Department of the City of Chicago, or any city
official, his agent or employee, for or on behalf of the City of Chicago, involving any public
works of the City of Chicago to refuse to employ or to discharge any person, otherwise
qualified, on account of race, color, creed, national origin, or ancestry; to discriminate for
the same reasons in regard to tenure, terms or conditions of employment; to deny promotion
or increase in compensation solely for these reasons, to publish offer of employment based
on such discrimination; to adopt or enforce any rule, or employment policy which discrimi.
nates between employees on account of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry;
to seek such information as to any employee as a condition of employment; to penalize any
employee or discriminate in the selection of personnel for training, solely on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry.
Section 3. All contracting agencies of the City of Chicago, or any department thereof,
shall include in all contracts hereafter negotiated or renegotiated by them a provision obli.
gating the contractor not to discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment
because of race, creed, color or national origin and shall require him to include a similar
provision in all sub-contracts.
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Section 4. It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate against any other person
by reason of race, creed, color or national origin, with respect to the hiring, application for
employment, tenure, terms or conditions of employment.
Section 5. Any person, firm or corporation who shall violate or fail to comply with
any of the provisions of this ordinance shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be pun-
ished by a fine in any sum not exceeding two hundred dollars ($200.00).
Section 6. If any part of this ordinance shall be declared invalid the balance of the
ordinance shall remain in full force and effect.
APPENDIX II
The proposed Detroit ordinance reads as follows:
Section 1. Findings and Statement of Policy
The Common Council of the City of Detroit finds that: A. Detroit's population is
composed of peoples of many diverse racial, religious and language groups. B. Unfair em-
ployment treatment and unequal economic opportunities accorded the members of Eome of
these groups, because of their race, creed, color and national origin or ancestry, has had the
effect of impairing their living standards; hampering their educational progress; under-
mining their health; has given rise to social and economic tensions and endangers the con-
tinued peace, safety and general welfare of the whole community. C. Such disadvantageous
treatment is contrary to democratic principles.
It is the policy of the City of Detroit, deemed essential to the continued welfare and
security of the City in this postwar period and afterwards, that there be a clearly defined
policy and an officially sanctioned program of inter-group and inter-cultural development
to the end that racial, religious and nationality prejudices may be dissipated; tensions eased
and removed; and discrimination in employment and employment opportunity brought
to an end.
Therefore, the Common Council of the City of Detroit does hereby prohibit certain
unfair employment practices as hereinafter defined; and establish the City of Detroit Com-
mission on Inter-Group Relations as an administrative agency charged with the duty of
supervising and effectuating the aforementioned policy by investigating and seeking to
adjust all alleged violations of this ordinance and providing for an educational program for
the City of Detroit designed to eliminate prejudices based on race, creed, color and national
origin or ancestry.
Section 2. Corerage
The provisions of this ordinance shall apply to and be binding upon:
(1) All departments of the City of Detroit:
(2) All officials, agents and employes of the City of Detroit and its instrumentalities
while acting for or on behalf of the City of Detroit;
(3) All contractors and their subcontractors and agents who are engaged in the con-
struction of public works for the City of Detroit or in the performance of any work
contract entered into with the City of Detroit;
(4) All private employers having ten or more employes engaged in a business or in
business enterprises located in the City of Detroit;
(5) All labor organizations having closed shop, union shop, maintenance of member-
ship or check-off contractual relations with any person, firm or corporation sub-
ject to this ordinance; and
(6) All private employment agencies licensed to do business in the City of Detroit.
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Section 3. Unfair Employment Practices
It shall be an unfair employment practice prohibited by this ordinance for any person,
firm, corporation or labor organization subject to this ordinance to:
(a) Discriminate against any person in regard to hire, tenure, terms or conditions of
employment, or union membership, solely because of race, creed, color, national
origin or ancestry; or
(b) Publish or cause to be published any help-wanted or other advertisement contain-
ing any specification or limitation as to race, creed, color or national origin or
ancestry; or
(c) Require of any applicant, as a condition of employment or membership, any in-
formation concerning the race, creed, color or national origin or ancestry of such
applicant; or
(d) Assent to, permit or condone the circulation on his premises or about his place of
business and/or among his employes during working hours any literature which
violates the provisions of the City of Detroit Anti-Defamation Ordinance. (443-D,
Chapter 117 Municipal Code of the City of Detroit, 1945. P. 456).
(e) Aid, abet, encourage or incite the commission of any unfair employment practice
forbidden by this ordinance.
Section 4. Contracts
(a) All departments and contracting agencies of the City of Detroit shall include in
all contracts and orders hereafter negotiated or renegotiated by them and which
require the employment of labor, a provision obligating the contractor, his agents
and subcontractors to observe the provisions of this ordinance. And no payment
shall be made by the City of Detroit on any such contract or order until there has
been filed with the City of Detroit, in such form and manner as the Corporation
Counsel may prescribe, a sworn statement certifying that such contract or order
has been or is being performed or filled in conformity with the provisions of this
ordinance.
Section 5. Sanctions
(a) Any person, firm, corporation, or labor organization who shall be adjudged guilty
of violating or failing to comply with any of the provisions of this ordinance shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less than $50
and not more than $100. The violation as to each person may be deemed a sepa-
rate offense. Provided, however, that no enforcement proceedings for any viola-
tion of this ordinance shall be instituted except as hereinafter provided.
(b) In addition to such other penalties as are provided herein for violations of this
ordinance, any person, firm or corporation subject to and adjudged guilty of violat-
ing Section 4 of this ordinance, shall be barred from bidding upon or receiving any
'future contracts or orders for a period of two (2) years from the date of such con-
viction, unless the Mayor shall find and declare that the public interest requires
that this subsection not be invoked.
Section 6. Commission on Inter-Group Relations
(a) There is hereby established the City of Detroit Commission on Inter-Group Rela-
tions, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, which shall consist of seven
members including a Chairman: The members of the Commission shall be repre-
sentative of the racial, religious and nationality groups comprising the bulk of
the population of the City of Detroit. They shall be appointed by the Mayor,
with the approval of the Common Council, and shall receive such per diem and
necessary expenses as the Common Council shall by resolution provide. Unless
removed by the Mayor for a cause approved by the Common Council, each mem-
ber of the Commission shall serve for a period of two (2) years and until his suc-
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cessor is duly appointed and qualified; provided, however, that four of the original
seven members of the Commission shall be appointed for a term of one (1) year.
(b) Within the limits of the funds which shall be made available by the Common
Council for the use of the Commission, the Mayor shall appoint and fix the com-
pensation of such staff and personnel (including a full-time executive secretary)
and make provision for such facilities, services and supplies as may be necessary
to enable the Commission to effectively and efficiently carry out its functions
under this ordinance.
(c) The Commission may utilize the services and facilities of the other departments
of the City and State agencies and such voluntary and uncompensated services
and facilities as may from time to time be needed.
Section 7. Duties of 17w Commission
The Commission shall function as an agency of the Common Council and it is author-
ized to and shall:
(a) Receive, investigate, mediate and seek to adjust all complaints of unfair employ-
ment practices forbidden by this ordinance.
(b) Formulate and carry out a comprehensive educational program designed to reduce
and ultimately eliminate prejudice based upon race, creed, color, national origin
and ancestry.
(c) Make such rules and regulations, subject to approval by the Common Council,
as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Commission and achieve the
purpose of this ordinance.
Section 8. Investigations and Hearings
In the performance of its duties under this ordinance the Commission may require the
attendance and/or information from any city department head, municipal employe or other
person, firm, corporation or labor organization subject to this ordinance, under the same
terms and conditions as the Common Council might. It may conduct hearings, take testi-
mony, make findings of fact and issue cease and desist orders to any person, firm, corpora-
tion or labor organization found to have violated or to be violating the provisions of this or-
dinance. In the event such person, firm, corporation or labor organization refuses or fails
to comply with any such order issued to it by the Commission, the Commission shall certify
the case and the entire record of its proceedings therein to the Corporation Counsel, who
shall proceed forthwith to invoke against such person, firm, corporation or labor organiza-
tion the sanctions provided in Section 5 of this ordinance.
Section 9. Effectie Date and Separability
(a) This ordinance may be cited as the Fair Employment Practices Ordinance of the
City of Detroit and shall become effective 90 days after its passage, provided that
Section 6 shall become effective immediately.
(b) If any part of this ordinance shall be declared invalid, the balance shall remain in
full force and effect.
(c) When the Chairman and a majority of the members of the Commission have been
appointed, qualified and take office, the present City of Detroit Interracial Com-
mittee shall cease to exist. All employes of said Committee shall then be trans-
ferred-to and become employes of the Commission, and all records, papers, other
property of the Committee and the remainder of any funds allocated to the Com-
mittee shall then pass into the possession and custody of the Commission.
